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Abstract
We survey the main results on strategic information transmission, which is often
referred to as \persuasion" when types are veriable and as \cheap talk" when they are
not. In the simplest \cheap talk" model, an informed player sends a single message to a
receiver who makes a decision. The players' utilities depend on the sender's information
and the receiver's decision, but not on the sender's message. Furthermore, the messages
that are available to the sender do not depend on his true information. As is well-known,
such a unilateral \cheap talk" can aect the sender's decision at equilibrium.
In a more general model, both players can exchange simultaneous costless messages
during several stages before the nal decision. The utility functions are unchanged. Multi-
stage conversation allows the players to reach more equilibrium outcomes, which possibly
Pareto dominate the original ones. More precisely, the set of equilibrium outcomes of long
cheap talk games is fully characterized; it increases with the number of communication
stages and can become even larger if no deadline is imposed.
Concentrating on cheap talk is not appropriate if the informed player can in
uence the
decision maker by producing unfalsiable documents. In order to capture this possibility
formally, one assumes that the informed player's set of messages depends on his private
information. The literature has mostly dealt with unilateral persuasion. But multistage,
bilateral communication enables the players to reach more equilibrium outcomes in the
case of veriable types as in the case of unveriable ones. Equilibria of long persuasion
games are fully characterized when information can be certied at any precision level.
Keywords: Cheap talk; certication; incomplete information; information transmission;
jointly controlled lotteries; veriable types.
JEL Classication: C72, D82.
1 Introduction
Models of strategic information transmission fall into two categories, according to whether
the agents' information is veriable or not. The term \persuasion game" is often associated
with the rst framework, while \cheap talk" typically refers to the second one.
Crawford and Sobel (1982) studied the eects of cheap talk in a particularly tractable
game. An informed expert sends a message to a decision maker. The same messages are
available to the expert, whatever his information. Both agents' utility depends on the sender's
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1information and on the receiver's action, but not on the message, which is thus costless.
Crawford and Sobel (1982) assume that the information states and the actions belong to a
real interval and that the utility functions satisfy specic properties. They characterize the
Nash equilibria of the game and show in particular that even in the absence of signalling cost,
information transmission can matter at equilibrium. We describe this result in section 2.3.
Before that, in section 2.1, we consider the class of all sender-receiver games in which
the set of information states and the set of actions are both nite, without imposing any
restriction on the utility functions. As in the previous model, the game involves a single
stage of information transmission, from the informed agent to the decision maker, and the
set of costless messages available to the sender does not depend on his private information.
Section 2.1 describes a geometric characterization of all Nash equilibria of the game of infor-
mation transmission. This result can be deduced from a characterization of Nash equilibria
in repeated games with incomplete information (see Aumann, Maschler, and Stearns, 1968,
Hart, 1985, and Aumann and Hart, 2003). Examples illustrate dierent possible kinds of
Nash equilibria: nonrevealing, fully revealing, and partially revealing. Section 2.2 brie
y
states some results for the particular class of \monotonic" games.
In standard cheap talk, the informed player can use the same messages, whatever his
information, which is thus unveriable. As pointed out, e.g., by Green and Laont (1986),
in some applications, the type of an agent determines the signals he can send. For instance,
if the sender privately knows his endowment, the receiver might require a concrete deposit
instead of cheap talk. In this case, the sender will not be able to pretend that he is richer than
he really is. \Certicates", which depend on the sender's information, can thus sometimes be
added to cheap talk messages. By making imitation hard or even impossible, such certicates
may help the informed player to reveal his information to a rational receiver.
The simplest version of a persuasion game involves an expert and a decision maker as in
section 2. The only dierence is that the set of messages that are available to the sender now
depends on his information. In section 3, we rst characterize Nash equilibria in the case of
nite sets of types and actions, as in Forges and Koessler (2006). Standard renements of
Nash equilibrium, as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which have no eects in cheap talk
games, can be quite powerful in persuasion games. This is illustrated in sections 3.2 and 3.3.
Following Milgrom (1981), several papers establish the existence, or even the uniqueness, of a
fully revealing equilibrium in dierent classes of persuasion games, in particular in a version
of Crawford and Sobel's model with veriable types.
In the models surveyed above, only the expert can talk, in a single phase of information
transmission. However, in their seminal study of two-person repeated games with lack of
information on one side, Aumann, Maschler, and Stearns (1968) show on examples that new
equilibria can be achieved if two or three stages of communication are feasible to the players.
They emphasize the crucial role of the uniformed player in this multistage communication: the
stages of pure information transmission, which are handled by the informed agent, alternate
with stages of compromise, in which both agents agree on the way to interact in the future.
2Hart (1985) fully characterized Nash equilibria in the repeated games introduced by Aumann,
Maschler, and Stearns. In that paper, the informed player not only sends costless messages
but also makes decisions which in
uence both players' utilities. The equilibria characterized
by Hart re
ect strategic information transmission, but also complex cooperation behavior (as
in the \Folk theorem").
However, Hart's characterization can be easily adapted to a variant of sender-receiver
games in which both agents talk cheaply, as long as they wish, before the decision maker se-
lects an action. By adapting Hart (1985)'s results to that framework, one can show that the
set of equilibria increases with the number of communication stages. Even more, some equi-
libria cannot be achieved, unless no deadline is imposed to the communication (see Forges,
1984, 1990, 1994). In section 4.1, we describe a geometric characterization of all Nash equi-
libria which can be achieved with nitely many stages of bilateral cheap talk, when the sets
of types and actions are nite. This result is based on Hart (1985) and Aumann and Hart
(2003), who use the techniques of innitely repeated games to analyze \long cheap talk".1
The previous results hold under the assumption that the sets of types and actions are
nite. What about Crawford and Sobel's famous model? Krishna and Morgan (2004) show
that, if both the expert and the decision maker can talk for a few stages, Crawford and
Sobel's partitional equilibria can be (ex ante) Pareto improved. We present that result in
section 4.2.
The review above shows that the eects of cheap talk, persuasion and long cheap talk have
deserved much attention. There remains to investigate \long persuasion", namely multistage
bilateral communication when the expert's information is veriable. In section 5, an example,
from Forges and Koessler (2006), shows that the informed player can then protably delay
the certication of information. We describe a characterization of all equilibria which can be
achieved with nitely many stages of bilateral communication, assuming that the expert can
certify his information at any precision level.
2 Unveriable Information: Cheap Talk Games
In this section, we deal with the standard model of information transmission, in which an
informed expert sends a single costless message to a decision maker. We characterize Nash
equilibria, rst in the case of nitely many types and actions, then in monotonic games and
in Crawford and Sobel's model.
1Innitely repeated games provide insights on strategic communication, but are technically very dierent
from long cheap talk games. For instance, a nonrevealing equilibrium always exists in Aumann and Hart
(2003), even if the informed player has to make a payo relevant decision at the end. However, proving the
existence of an equilibrium in Hart (1985) is extremely hard (see Renault, 2000, Simon, Spiez, and Torunczyk,
1995, and Sorin, 1983).
32.1 A geometric characterization of Nash equilibria
Let K be the nite set of possible states of information, or types, of the expert, player 1. We
assume for expository purposes that there are only two possible types: K = fk1;k2g = f1;2g.
The decision maker, player 2, has no private information; he must choose an action j in a
nite set J. Let Pr(k1) = p and Pr(k2) = 1 p. Given a state k and an action j, the utilities
of player 1 and player 2 are denoted as Ak(j) and Bk(j) respectively. The corresponding
decision problem, or game without communication, is denoted as  (p).
Let y 2 (J) be a mixed strategy of the decision maker in  (p). The corresponding
expected payos are Ak(y) =
P
j2J y(j)Ak(j) and Bk(y) =
P
j2J y(j)Bk(j). The equilibria
of  (p), which will be referred to as nonrevealing equilibria, are simply the optimal mixed
strategies of the decision maker, given his belief p over the expert's type:
Y (p)  arg max
y2(J)

pB1(y) + (1   p)B2(y)

:
The set of all equilibrium payos of  (p) can be described as
E(p)  f(a;) 2 R2  R : 9 y 2 Y (p); a = A(y);  = pB1(y) + (1   p)B2(y)g:
The unilateral cheap talk game is constructed by adding a single phase of communication,
from the expert to the decision maker, between the information phase (in which the expert
learns his type) and the decision phase (in which the decision maker chooses an action). In the
communication phase, the expert sends a message m 2 M, with 3  jMj < 1. The unilateral
communication game is denoted as  0
S(p).2 In this game, a strategy of the expert is a mapping
 : K ! (M), which associates a probability distribution over the set of messages M to
each possible type. A strategy of the decision maker is a mapping  : M ! (J), which
associates a probability distribution over the set of actions J to every possible message. Let
us denote as E0
S(p) the set of all Nash equilibrium payos of the unilateral communication
game  0
S(p).
An equilibrium of  0
S(p) is fully revealing (FRE) if player 1 sends a dierent message for
each of his possible types. It is nonrevealing (NRE) if player 2's strategy is independent of
the messages that are sent at equilibrium. It is partially revealing (PRE) if it does not fall
in one of the previous two categories.
It is easily checked that a cheap talk game always has a NRE in which the expert sends the
same message whatever his type and the decision maker uses the same optimal strategy in the
game without communication whatever the expert's message. In other words, E(p)  E 0
S(p).
We will describe a geometric characterization of E0
S(p), adapted from Hart (1985) (see also
Forges, 1994).
Let us denote as E+(p) the set of modied equilibrium payos of the game without com-
2The upper index \0" indicates that information is not certiable. The lower index \S" stands to recall
that the game is a signalling game, by contrast with bilateral communication.
4munication  (p), in which the expert's payos are extended when p = 0 or p = 1, by allowing
a zero probability type to make a (virtual) gain that exceeds the equilibrium payo. More
precisely, E+(p) is the set of payos (a;) 2 R2  R such that there exists an equilibrium
y 2 Y (p) of  (p) verifying the following conditions:
(i) ak  Ak(y), for every k 2 K;
(ii) a1 = A1(y) if p 6= 0 and a2 = A2(y) if p 6= 1;
(iii)  = pB1(y) + (1   p)B2(y).
In particular, E+(p) = E(p) if p 2 ]0;1[. The graph of the modied equilibrium payo
correspondence is denoted as
grE+  f(a;;p) 2 R2  R  [0;1] : (a;) 2 E+(p)g:
Theorem 1 (Characterization of E0
S(p)) Let p 2 ]0;1[. A payo (a;) is an equilib-
rium payo of the unilateral communication game  0
S(p) if and only if (a;;p) belongs to
conva(grE+), the set of all points that can be obtained by convexifying the set grE + in (;p)
while keeping constant the expert payo, a:
E0
S(p) = f(a;) 2 R2  R : (a;;p) 2 conva(grE+)g:
See Hart (1985), Forges (1994) and Aumann and Hart (2003) for a proof. The result
remains true for an arbitrary number  of expert's types, provided that jMj   +1. Let us
illustrate the characterization on examples.
Example 1 (No revelation of information) The game without communication and its
equilibria are given by gure 1.3 The graph of the modied equilibrium payos, grE+, is
represented in the expert's payo space on gure 2. The absence of any intersection point
indicates that no new point can be obtained by convexifying the graph when the expert's
vector payo, a = (a1;a2), is xed. Hence, whatever the prior probability p 2 ]0;1[, the set
of equilibrium payos is the same, whether communication is allowed or not: E(p) = E 0
S(p).
j1 j2 j3
k1 3;0 2;3 1;4 p





fj1g if p < 1=4;
fj2g if p 2 ]1=4;3=4[;
fj3g if p > 3=4:
Figure 1: Game without communication and optimal actions in example 1.
3We do not indicate the optimal mixed actions for values of p at the border of the intervals; obviously,
Y (p) = (fj1;j2g) when p = 1=4, and Y (p) = (fj2;j3g) when p = 3=4.
















Figure 2: Expert's modied equilibrium payos in example 1.
Example 2 (Credible revelation of information) Consider the game without commu-
nication of gure 2. The graph of the modied equilibrium payos is represented on gure 4.
The only point of intersection is (1;3), at p = 0 and at p = 1. Hence, by convexifying the
graph in p while xing (1;3), one gets (1;3) as a fully revealing equilibrium payo at every
p 2 ]0;1[.
j1 j2
k1 1;1 0;0 p
k2 0;0 3;3 (1   p)
Y (p) =
(
fj1g if p > 3=4;
fj2g if p < 3=4:

















Figure 4: Expert's modied equilibrium payos in example 2.
Example 3 (Partial revelation of information) The basic game and the optimal ac-
tions of the decision maker, as a function of p, are described by gure 5. The graph of
6the modied equilibrium payos is depicted in gure 6. For p = 2 ]3=10;4=5[ all equilibria of
the game with communication are nonrevealing, while for p 2 ]3=10;4=5[, there exists a PRE
yielding the vector payo (11=4;23=8) to the expert.
j1 j2 j3 j4
k1 4;0 2;7 5;9 1;10 p
k2 1;10 4;7 4;4 2;0 (1   p)
Y (p) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
fj1g if p < 3=10,
fj2g if p 2 ]3=10;7=10[,
fj3g if p 2 ]7=10;4=5[,
fj4g if p > 4=5.
Figure 5: Game without communication and optimal actions in example 3.




















Figure 6: Expert's modied equilibrium payos in example 3.
2.2 Monotonic games
The preferences of the expert are monotonic if the decision maker's actions can be ordered
in such a way that
Ak(j) > Ak(j0) , j > j0; 8 k 2 K:
Monotonic games have been extensively studied in the context of veriable information (see
section 3).
If the expert has two possible types and the optimal action of the decision maker is
monotonic in his belief p on k1 (as in example 1), then the geometric characterization of
theorem 1 shows that the unique equilibrium of the communication game is nonrevealing,
whatever the prior p, since the graph of the expert's modied equilibrium payos has no
intersection point. More generally, in a monotonic communication game such that jKj  2,
it is easy to show that every Nash equilibrium in which the decision maker plays a pure
strategy is nonrevealing.4 This conclusion also applies in monotonic games in which J is a
4This result can be proved along the same lines as Watson (1996, theorem 1). Notice that partially and
7real interval (instead of being nite) and Bk() is strictly concave over J for every k, since the
decision maker then plays a pure strategy (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1980, Grossman,
1981, Milgrom, 1981, Milgrom and Roberts, 1986).
2.3 Partitional equilibria: Crawford and Sobel's model
Crawford and Sobel (1982) is one of the rst articles on costless strategic information trans-
mission (see also Green and Stokey, 1980). We concentrate here on the simplest version of
the model, known as \uniform-quadratic". The expert has a continuum of possible types in
K = [0;1]; similarly, his set of messages is M = [0;1]. The set of actions of the decision maker
is J = [0;1]. The prior probability distribution over K is uniform. The utility functions of
the expert and the decision maker have the following form:
Ak(j) =  

j   (k + b)





When k increases, both players prefer that the action increases but the expert's ideal
action, j
1(k) = argmaxj Ak(j) = k + b, is always strictly greater than the decision maker's
one, j
2(k) = argmaxj Bk(j) = k. The parameter b can thus be interpreted as the \bias of
the expert".
Crawford and Sobel consider a single stage of information transmission, from the expert
to the decision maker. They characterize the equilibria of the game by showing that they are
all \partitional". More precisely, the equilibrium strategy of the expert  : K ! M consists
of sending n dierent messages, for some integer n: (k) = m1 if k 2 [0;x1[, ..., (k) = ml if
k 2 [xl 1;xl[, ..., (k) = mn if k 2 [xn 1;1], with 0 < x1 <  < xn 1 < xn = 1, ml 6= ml0
8 l 6= l0.
By expressing the decision maker's best reply conditions and going back inductively to
the expert's equilibrium conditions, one gets
xl = l=n   2lb(n   l); l = 1;:::;n:
The fact that the xl's must remain positive yields the following condition for the existence of
a partitional equilibrium with n dierent messages, also called n-separating equilibrium:




Given a bias b, the greatest n for which there exists an n-separating equilibrium is thus
the greatest n such that 2n(n   1)b < 1 (which is equal to 2 if b = 1=4 and goes to +1 as
b ! 0).
It is dicult to compare the dierent equilibria in terms of interim eciency since the
fully revealing equilibria may exist in monotonic games in which the decision maker plays in mixed strategies.
8preferred equilibrium of the expert depends in general on his type. However, the equilibria
can be compared ex ante: both players always prefer the equilibrium in which the largest
number of dierent messages are sent. In particular, cheap talk ex ante Pareto improves upon
the equilibria of the game without communication.
Crawford and Sobel (1982) extend their approach by assuming, basically, that:
(A) The prior probability distribution over types has a density.
(B) The utility functions Ak() and Bk() are concave in j for every k 2 K, and j
1(k) =
argmaxj2J Ak(j), j




2(k) for every k 2 K, so D(k) = j
2(k)   j
1(k) has always the same sign.5
In the more general model, they show that all equilibria are n-separating, and that such
equilibria exist for increasing values of n when the players' preferences become more similar to
each other. However, in general, equilibria cannot be compared in terms of ex ante eciency.
3 Veriable Information: Persuasion Games
In the previous section, we have assumed that the communicating abilities of a player did
not depend on his knowledge. We relax this assumption. The messages that can possibly
be sent by the informed player now depend on his type, i.e., on his private information.
This information is thus (partially) veriable or certiable. The corresponding unilateral
communication game is traditionally referred to as a persuasion game. In this case, it may
be hard or even impossible for a player's type to imitate another. Hence the set of equilibrium
outcomes is in general quite dierent from the one that is achieved with pure cheap talk.
We state an analog of theorem 1, namely a geometric characterization of Nash equilibria
in persuasion games and illustrate it on an example. We then study the eect of some stan-
dard equilibrium renements (subgame perfect equilibrium and perfect Bayesian equilibrium)
which have no bite on cheap talk games but prove useful in persuasion games. We nally
consider certication in a framework that extends Crawford and Sobel (1982)'s one.
3.1 A geometric characterization of Nash equilibria
The timing of the unilateral persuasion game, denoted as  S(p), is the same as in the unilateral
cheap talk game  0
S(p), except that the set of messages that are available to the expert depends
on k, and is denoted as M(k), k 2 K. Let M1 = M(k1) [ M(k2) be the set of all possible
messages for the expert. We assume that the expert can certify any of his types (i.e., for
every k there exists ck 2 M1 such that M 1(ck) = fkg) and that there are at least three
cheap talk messages, which do not certify any information (i.e., jM(k1) \ M(k2)j  3).
5In Melumad and Shibano (1991), Gordon (2006) and sub-section 3.3, this assumption is relaxed, i.e., D(k)
can change sign.
9A strategy of the expert in the persuasion game is a mapping  : K ! (M 1) such
that supp(k)  M(k). A strategy of the decision maker is a mapping  : M 1 ! (J).
We denote as ES(p) the set of all Nash equilibrium payos of the unilateral persuasion game
 S(p).
When we characterized the Nash equilibria of the unilateral cheap talk game, we consid-
ered the set E+(p) of modied equilibrium payos of the game without communication  (p).
Here, we consider the larger set E++(p) of extended equilibrium payos of  (p), for which
there exists y 2 Y (p) such that properties (ii) and (iii) on page 5 (but not property (i)) are
satised. E++(p) is thus the set of equilibrium payos of the game without communication,
except that, at a type of zero probability, the expert can get any payo (above but also below
his equilibrium payo). We denote as grE++  f(a;;p) 2 R2 R[0;1] : (a;) 2 E++(p)g
the graph of the correspondence of extended equilibrium payos and as
INTIR  f(a;;p) 2 R2  R  [0;1] : 9  y 2 (J); ak  Ak( y) 8 k 2 Kg;
the set of all points (a;;p) such that a is interim individually rational for the expert.
Theorem 2 (Characterization of ES(p)) Let p 2 ]0;1[. A payo (a;) is an equilibrium
payo of the unilateral persuasion game  S(p) if and only if (a;;p) belongs to conva(grE++)\
INTIR, the set of all points obtained by convexifying the set grE++ in (;p) while keeping
constant and individually rational the expert's payo, a:
ES(p) = f(a;) 2 R2  R : (a;;p) 2 conva(grE++) \ INTIRg:
See Forges and Koessler (2006) for a proof. The theorem remains true for an arbitrary
number of types of the expert provided that the latter can certify any subset of types L  K.
Let us rst illustrate the previous characterization on example 1 (gure 1 on page 5). We
have seen that revelation of information through cheap talk was not credible. One checks
immediately that, if each type k can send a certicate, m = ck, that is only available to
type k, the game has a fully revealing equilibrium. The next example taken from Forges
and Koessler (2006), exhibits other kinds of equilibria with information certication, some of
them with partial certication. We will come back to it to illustrate the impact of multistage,
bilateral communication in section 5.
Example 4 Consider the game without communication of gure 7, with Pr[k1] = 1=2.
Let ck be a certicate for type k, and  m 2 M(k1) \ M(k2) be a cheap talk message.
There exist a FRE and a NRE, with respective vector payos (2;1) and (0;0) for the expert.
There are also two partially revealing equilibria; one of them, denoted as PRE1, gives the
expert a higher payo than both pure strategy equilibria. At PRE1, player 1 certies his
information (namely, he sends the message c1) with probability 1/3 and remains silent, i.e.,
sends the message  m, with probability 2/3 if his type is k1; he always remains silent, i.e.,
10j1 j2 j3 j4 j5
k1 5;0 3;4 0;7 4;9 2;10 p
k2 1;10 3;9 0;7 5;4 6;0 (1   p)
Y (p) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
fj1g if p < 1=5;
fj2g if p 2 ]1=5;2=5[;
fj3g if p 2 ]2=5;3=5[;
fj4g if p 2 ]3=5;4=5[;
fj5g if p > 4=5:
Figure 7: Game without communication and optimal actions in example 4.
sends the message  m if his type is k2. The posterior beliefs of player 2 are then Pr(k1 j  m) =
Pr(  mjk1)Pr(k1)
Pr(  m) = 2=5 and Pr(k1 j c1) = 1, so that he plays action j5 when he receives message
c1, and he is indierent between j2 and j3 when he receives message  m. If he chooses j2 with
probability 2/3 and j3 with probability 1/3 on  m, and chooses j1 on the out of equilibrium
message c2, player 1 cannot gain in deviating and his vector payo is equal to (2;2). The
second partially revealing equilibrium, which we denote as PRE2, is symmetric to PRE1:
player 1 always sends message  m on k1, and sends message c2 with probability 1/3 and
message  m with probability 2/3 on k2, and player 2 chooses j1 on c2, 4
5j3 + 1
5j4 on  m and j3
on the out of equilibrium message c1. At PRE2, player 1's expected payo is (4=5;1). If the
prior probability of the rst type is Pr[k1] = 1=2, there is no other Nash equilibrium.
Let us make the connection with the geometric characterization stated above. The graph
of the correspondence of modied equilibrium payos, grE+, is represented in the expert's
payo space by solid lines on gure 8 on the following page. According to theorem 1, the
absence of any intersection point means that all equilibria of the cheap talk game are nonre-
vealing. The graph of the correspondence of extended equilibrium payos, grE ++, is repre-
sented on the same gure by the solid and dashed lines. Since all the points at the North-East
of (0;0) are interim individually rational, the convexication of grE ++, keeping the expert
payo constant and individually rational, generates three new points at p = 1=2: FRE, PRE1
and PRE2, which are exactly the three Nash equilibrium payos identied previously, in ad-
dition to the NRE. Observe that PRE3, for instance, is not an equilibrium payo at p = 1=2
since 1=2 = 2 [3=5;1].
The standard equilibrium renements are useless in cheap talk games (see for instance
Kreps and Sobel, 1994 and Blume, 1994). This is no longer the case in persuasion games
in which some Nash equilibria clearly depend on non-credible threats. For instance, in ex-
ample 4, the nonrevealing equilibrium (NRE) and the second partially revealing equilibrium
(PRE2) are not subgame perfect. Indeed, in the subgame following certicate c1, the only
optimal decision is j5, and in the subgame following c2, the only optimal decision is j1.
In persuasion games, the geometric characterization of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE)
payos, or of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) payos, is obtained by strengthening the
interim individual rationality condition of the expert. In an SPE, when the expert certies





























Figure 8: Modied (solid lines) and extended (solid and dashed lines) equilibrium payos of
the expert in example 4.
when the expert's type is k. In a PBE, one must require in addition that given an out of
equilibrium cheap talk message, the decision maker's action be optimal for some beliefs over
K. Formally, in the geometric characterization of theorem 2, the expert's payo, a = (a1;a2),
must satisfy the following additional conditions:
9  y1 2 Y (1) such that a1  A1( y1)
9  y2 2 Y (0) such that a2  A2( y2);
at a SPE, together with
9 p 2 (K);  y 2 Y (p) such that ak  Ak( y) 8 k 2 K;
at a PBE. These requirements are easily adapted when there are more than two types (see
Forges and Koessler, 2006). In the sequel of this section, the equilibrium concept is PBE,
unless explicitly mentioned.
3.2 Monotonic games and skepticism
Let us go back to monotonic games, with an arbitrary set of types K. We have seen that,
in these games, cheap talk did not enable the expert to credibly reveal his information (see
section 2.2). Let us assume now that each type can be fully certied: for every k 2 K, there
exists m 2 M(k) such that M 1(m) = fkg. A skeptical strategy for the decision maker
consists of choosing the minimal action among his best replies, given the types that are
12compatible with the received message. By relying on such strategies, one can show that any
monotonic persuasion game has a fully revealing equilibrium. Under further assumptions,
for instance if J is a real interval and Bk(j) is strictly concave in j for every k, this FRE is
unique (see Milgrom, 1981, Grossman, 1981, Milgrom and Roberts, 1986).
3.3 Persuasion in Crawford and Sobel's model
In this subsection, we will see that, even if the underlying persuasion game is not monotonic,
sucient conditions can be given for the existence and/or the uniqueness of a FRE. This is the
aim of Seidmann and Winter (1997), who studied the transmission of certiable information
in a model that encompasses Crawford and Sobel (1982)'s one. Seidmann and Winter (1997)
essentially make the assumptions detailed at the end of subsection 2.3, except for condition
(C) on page 9: the sign of D(k) = j
2(k)   j
1(k) is not necessarily constant. A set of types
L  K is certiable if there exists a message m which enables the expert to prove that his
type belongs to L, i.e., such that M 1(m) = L. Seidmann and Winter (1997) assume that
M 1(m) is closed and that every singleton fkg, k 2 K, is certiable. Under the previous
general assumptions and either
(a) D(k) does not change sign over K, or
(b) D(k) changes sign once over K, and D(0) > 0,
they prove that there exists a fully revealing equilibrium, and that all equilibria are fully
revealing.
Existence and uniqueness of the FRE are thus guaranteed in the most general model con-
sidered by Crawford and Sobel (1982), in particular in the uniform-quadratic case. Seidmann
and Winter (1997) also establish the existence of a not necessarily unique FRE when D(k)
changes sign several times, provided that the expert's preferences satisfy a \single crossing"
condition.
4 Multistage Communication with Unveriable Types
In some economic interactions, the expert just prepares a technical report for the decision
maker. In that case, the model of one shot, unilateral communication is fully appropriate. But
in most interactive situations, the agents can talk with each other, so that multistage, bilateral
communication is more natural. Even if only one of the players has private information,
a conversation between the two of them enables them to generate stages of compromise,
whose outcome is not determined in advance and cannot be individually controlled by any
of the participants. These stages, which can be interpreted as reduced forms of negotiation,
typically create uncertainty in the way information transmission will go on. Formally, the
players perform jointly controlled lotteries, a tool that was rst introduced in the study of
repeated games with incomplete information (Aumann et al., 1968). Let us illustrate how it
works on a simple example.
13Imagine that player 1 and player 2 want to choose between two outcomes H and T
with equal probability but cannot rely on any extraneous device. They can simultaneously
send one of two messages to each other, with the prescription that both of them use a fair
coin. If H is selected when both players send the same message and T is selected otherwise,
Pr(H) = Pr(T) = 1=2 as soon as one of the players uses the prescribed strategy. Unilateral
deviations are thus useless.
Combined with stages of information transmission, jointly controlled lotteries can modify
the expert's incentives to reveal information, giving rise to outcomes which could never be
achieved with unilateral communication, as we will see in the next subsection.
4.1 A geometric characterization of Nash equilibria
Let us construct, from   and p, the communication game  0
n(p), by inserting n stages of
bilateral communication between the information phase and the action phase of the basic
game  (p). In particular, we still assume, for simplicity, that the expert has only two possible
types. Let M1 and M2 be nite sets of messages, such that jMij  2, i = 1;2. At every stage
t = 1;:::;n of the conversation phase, the expert sends a message m1
t 2 M1 to the decision
maker, and, simultaneously, the decision maker sends a message m2
t 2 M2 to the expert.6





Mt  (M1  M2)
t. A strategy  of the expert in  0
n(p) consists in a sequence of mappings
1;:::;n, where t : K  Mt 1 ! (M1), t = 1;:::;n. Similarly, a strategy  of the
decision maker is described by mappings 1;:::;n, together with a function n+1, where
t : Mt 1 ! (M2), t = 1;:::;n, and n+1 : Mn ! (J).
Let E0
n(p) be the set of Nash equilibrium payos of the n stage bilateral communica-
tion game  0
n(p). As in the basic game  (p) and the unilateral communication game  0
S(p)
considered previously, the payos are computed at the interim stage, so that the expert's
payo is indexed by his type. Clearly, E0
S(p)  E0
n(p)  E0





n(p) be the set of all payos which can be achieved at a Nash equilibrium
of some bilateral communication game, of arbitrary nite length, constructed from   and p.
The characterization of E0
B(p) below is based on the results of Hart (1985) and Aumann and
Hart (2003).7
As we have seen in section 2.1, provided that we slightly modify the graph of the equilib-
rium payos of the game without communication into grE+, the condition for the expert to
reveal information at an equilibrium of  0
S(p) is that his expected vector payo be the same,
whatever the message he sends. Hence, geometrically, the graph grE0
S of the equilibrium
payos achieved with a single stage of unilateral communication can be obtained by convex-
ifying grE+ in (;p) while keeping constant the expert's payo, a (see theorem 1). Let us
6We do not need to assume anymore that the expert has at least three messages, as we did for unilateral
communication, since we can add further communication stages.
7These articles do not require that the conversation between the expert and the decision last for nitely
many stages; we will comment on this later on.
14set H0
1 = grE0
S = conva(grE+); H0
1 is convex in (;p) when a is xed, but new points can
be obtained by convexifying H0
1 in (a;) while keeping constant the probability p. This is
exactly the eect of a jointly controlled lottery, as seen above. The graph of the equilibrium
payos achieved with one stage of information transmission and one jointly controlled lottery,
H0
2, can thus be obtained as convp(H0
1). H0
2 being not necessarily convex in (;p) when a
is xed, one can perform another step of convexication: H0
3 = conva(H0
2). A payo (a;)
such that (a;;p) 2 H0
3 corresponds to an equilibrium of E0
3(p) which is achieved by means of
two stages of information transmission, and a compromise stage taking place between them.
During that stage, both players exchange messages. The gradual convexication process just
described for 3 stages can possibly go on n = 4; 5; :::
A subset of R2R[0;1] is diconvex if it is convex in (;p) when a is xed and convex in
(a;) when p is xed. We get E0
B(p) as the section in p of dico(grE+), the smallest diconvex
set containing grE+. In other words:
Theorem 3 (Characterization of E0
B(p)) Let p 2 ]0;1[. A payo (a;) is an equilibrium
payo of some bilateral communication game  0
n(p), for some length n, if and only if (a;;p)
belongs to dico(grE+), the set of all points obtained by diconvexifying the set grE+:
E0
B(p) = f(a;) 2 R2  R : (a;;p) 2 dico(grE+)g:
See Hart (1985), Forges (1994) and Aumann and Hart (2003) for a proof. The theorem
is true whatever the number of types of the expert.
A natural question is whether there are games in which some equilibrium payos cannot
be achieved with a bounded number n of communication stages, but can be reached if no
deadline is imposed to the communication process. The answer is positive, as shown in Forges
(1984, 1990) on a simple game of the same form as example 4, with two types for the expert
and ve actions for the decision maker.
The equilibrium payos obtained by diconvexication (i.e., as in theorem 3) can also be
described as starting points of particular martingales, called dimartingales (Aumann and
Hart, 1986) because the p- and a-coordinates never split simultaneously, which converge to
grE+ in a nite, known in advance, number of stages. The equilibrium payo exhibited in
Forges (1984, 1990) is achieved through a dimartingale which converges in a nite but not
bounded number of stages, which is endogenously determined by the equilibrium. Hart (1985)
and Aumann and Hart (2003) even consider dimartingales which reach their nonrevealing
limit in innitely many stages. In this case, the expert never stops transmitting information,
but convergence requires that he gradually reveals less and less information. According to
Aumann and Hart (2003), the bilateral communication taking place before the single decision
phase can last forever. We do not know of any game which would illustrate this phenomenon
(see Aumann and Hart, 1986, for a geometric example, and Krishna, 2005 for a discussion of
this issue).
154.2 Conversation in Crawford and Sobel's model
Let us go back to the uniform-quadratic version of Crawford and Sobel (1982)'s model (see
subsection 2.3), but consider now three stages of communication, consisting of two stages
of information transmission from the expert to the decision maker, with a stage of bilateral
communication in between. The latter stage enables the agents to generate a jointly controlled
lottery as above. Krishna and Morgan (2004) show that, for intermediary values of the
expert's bias (like b = 1=10), there may exist monotonic equilibria (i.e., in which the action of
the decision maker increases with the expert's type) which Pareto improve upon all equilibria
of the unilateral communication game. For a high bias of the expert (say, b = 7=24), while the
only equilibrium of the unilateral communication is nonrevealing (because b = 7=24 > 1=4,
see subsection 2.3), there may exist a Pareto improving, non-monotonic, partially revealing
equilibrium in the three stage communication game (see Krishna and Morgan, 2004, for
details and statements which indicate that the previous Pareto improving equilibria are not
accidental).
5 Multistage Communication with Veriable Types
Consider again the persuasion game of example 4, with two equally likely states. We have
already found four Nash equilibria; the partially revealing equilibrium PRE1 is the best one
for the expert, with an expected payo of 2, whatever his type. We will now show that
several stages of bilateral communication allow the expert to certify his information with
some delay and to increase his expected payo up to the amount of 3, whatever his type.
This equilibrium, which is depicted on gure 9 on the next page, is achieved by means of
two stages of information transmission, separated by a jointly controlled lottery (denoted as
JCL) .
In the same way as the equilibrium payos of the multistage cheap talk games (see theorem
3), the expert's equilibrium payo (3;3) at p = 1=2 can be constructed geometrically by
diconvexifying an adapted graph of nonrevealing equilibrium payos. More precisely, let us
consider a persuasion game  n(p) with the same timing as the communication game  0
n(p)
of section 4.1, but in which, at every stage t = 1;:::;n, the set of messages M(k) that are
available to the expert depends on his type k, exactly as in the unilateral persuasion game (see
section 3.1). We still assume that the expert can remain silent, but, by increasing the number
of communication stages, one can limit the number of messages. M 1 = M(k1)[M(k2) is the
set of all the messages that the expert could possibly send, from the decision maker point of
view. The latter can now also send a message in M 2, jM2j  2, at every stage.
A history of length t = 0;1;:::;n in  n(p) can be dened as in  0
n(p) (namely, as if the
types were not veriable, since every message in M 1 is a priori conceivable, from the decision
maker's point of view). In particular, Mt = (M1  M2)
t. However, a strategy  of the expert
in the persuasion game  n(p) must be dened over those messages that are really available























































Figure 9: An equilibrium outcome of the three-stage communication game from example 4.
and k
t : Mt 1 ! (M(k)) for k = 1; 2 and t = 1;:::;n . The decision maker's strategies
are as in  0
n(p).
Let En(p) be the set of Nash equilibrium payos of  n(p). ES(p)  En(p)  En+1(p) for
every n  1. Let EB(p) =
S
n1 En(p) be the set of all payos corresponding to some Nash
equilibrium of some bilateral persuasion game constructed from  (p), with an arbitrary nite
number of communication stages. The next theorem gives a characterization of EB(p) in
the particular case of two types for the expert, which we have concentrated on all along the
paper. The sets INTIR and grE++ are dened as in section 3.1.
Theorem 4 (Characterization of EB(p)) Let p 2 ]0;1[. A payo (a;) is an equilibrium
payo of a multistage bilateral persuasion game  n(p), for some length n, if and only if
(a;;p) belongs to dico(grE++) \ INTIR, the set of all points obtained by diconvexifying the
set of all payos in grE+ that are interim individually rational for the expert:
EB(p) = f(a;) 2 R2  R : (a;;p) 2 dico(grE++) \ INTIRg:
See Forges and Koessler (2006) for a proof. A similar, but more intricate, characterization
holds if the number of types of the expert exceeds two (see the comment below), provided
that the expert can certify any subset of types L  K.
When the expert has only two types, the characterization of EB(p) is a mere transposition
of the one of E0
B(p) (theorem 3): it suces to replace grE+ with grE++ \ INTIR. One can
17indeed check that, if jKj = 2, dico(grE++)\INTIR = dico(grE++\INTIR). The peculiarity
of the two type case comes from the fact that as soon as the posterior probability distribution
in some step s, ps, reaches the boundary of the \simplex" (which is just an interval here), the
true type of the expert is fully revealed and the game cannot evolve anymore. The individual
rationality condition for the expert can be expressed as (as;s;ps) 2 INTIR, one of the
components of as being articially xed at its previous value. If the expert has more than
two types, a natural way to keep a similar characterization as above is to dene individual
rationality for the expert with respect to the posterior probability distribution in each step
of the process of convexication. Such a characterization is proposed in Forges and Koessler
(2006). In its general form, for jKj  2, the result is less tractable than the corresponding one
for unveriable information (theorem 3). Indeed, due to the additional (individual rationality)
constraint that is imposed all along the martingale, the latter evolves in a set which is not
necessarily diconvex. Hence, there is no reason to expect the graph grEB of all equilibrium
payos of the multistage persuasion game to be diconvex.
Let us illustrate theorem 4 on the equilibrium of example 4 analyzed above (gure 9). At
p = 1=4, a jointly controlled lottery followed by an information transmission stage enables
us to convexify, p remaining xed, the set of all equilibrium payos achieved with one stage
communication; we obtain the triangle [j2;FRE;PRE2] of gure 8 on page 12. Similarly,
at p = 3=4, we obtain the expert's equilibrium payos in the triangle [j4;FRE;PRE3]. A
further convexication, with a xed, thus enables us to get as expert's equilibrium payos,
for every p 2 ]1=4;3=4[ (in particular, p = 1=2), the intersection of the previous two triangles
(in particular, a = (3;3)).
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